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Arbitration for the “Afflicted” – the
Viability of Arbitrating Defamation
and Libel Claims Considering IPSO’s
Pilot Program
EMMA ALTHEIDE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Filing suit for defamation or libel is signing up for an expensive and time-consuming endeavor. If it proceeds to trial, this type of litigation comes with high costs
for both sides: potentially millions of dollars in legal fees, and years of court battles.1 Average judgments against defendant publishers are high, often because uncapped punitive damages are available.2 Plaintiffs may wait years to receive a judgment,3 only to spend a significant portion on attorneys’ fees.4 Given the inefficiency
of the courts in handling defamation and libel claims, how might an alternative forum provide for a quicker process, with lower costs for both sides? How would
such a forum affect the interests of the parties? Would the characteristics of arbitration alleviate some of the tensions between litigation and the law that allows people to protect their reputation? This Comment addresses the implications of resolving defamation and libel claims against the press through arbitration, and argues
that it is critical for the press to consider utilizing arbitration for these claims, as
more publishers face financial pressures and litigation poses a more serious threat
than ever before. If the role of the press is to “comfort the afflicted and afflict the
comfortable,”5 a viable forum for resolving disputes is critical to its continued existence and success.
*

B.S. Iowa State University 2015, J.D. University of Missouri 2018. I would like to thank the Editorial
Board of the Journal of Dispute Resolution and my advisor Professor Richard Reuben for the time and
effort assisting with this Comment. I would also like to thank the late Barbara Mack for fostering my
interest in journalism and the law, and for reminding her students to never stop learning.
1. Daxton R. Stewart, The Promise Of Arbitration: Can It Succeed In Journalism As It Has In Other
Businesses?, 6 APPALACHIAN J. L. 135, 136-37 (2006).
2. Id. at 137.
3. Id. at 138.
4. David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem and Possible Solution,
39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1208 (1995).
5. This quote comes from the fictional character “Mr. Dooley,” created by journalist Finley Peter
Dunne. The quote first appeared in a 1902 book, OBSERVATIONS BY MR. DOOLEY. FINLEY PETER
DUNNE, OBSERVATIONS BY MR. DOOLEY 240 (1902). For a more extensive history of the quote, see
David Shedden, Today in Media History: Mr. Dooley: ‘The job of the newspaper is to comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable’, POYNTER (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.poynter.org/2014/today-inmedia-history-mr-dooley-the-job-of-the-newspaper-is-to-comfort-the-afflicted-and-afflict-the-comfortable/273081/ (quoting FINLEY PETER DUNNE, OBSERVATIONS BY MR. DOOLEY 240 (1902)); see also
Stewart, supra note 1, at 161. Discussed later in this Comment, “afflict the comfortable” was one of the
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Recognizing many of the issues associated with litigating defamation and libel
claims, major press outlets in the United Kingdom agreed to take part in a pilot
arbitration scheme launched in July 2016 by the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), a regulatory body charged with oversight of press in the U.K.6
IPSO was formed as a result of the Leveson Inquiry, an investigation into British
media.7 The inquiry culminated in an extensive report, which advocated for an alternative option to litigation of defamation and libel claims, leading to the launch
of IPSO’s pilot arbitration program. Part II of this Comment discusses the events
that gave rise to the Leveson Inquiry, and the objectives of the Leveson Report that
the pilot arbitration program was designed to address. Part III will address the current media landscape in the United States, and discuss why press outlets are now
poised to consider what options to traditional litigation could provide them with
time and cost savings. Part IV of this Comment focuses on the interests of plaintiffs
in defamation and libel cases, and how arbitration might serve or obstruct those
interests, looking to IPSO’s pilot program as a prospective framework. It is important to note that while arbitration issues often hinge on questions of contract law,
this discussion is limited to the implications of voluntary agreements to arbitrate
defamation and libel claims against the press.

II.

THE LEVESON REPORT AND IPSO’S PILOT ARBITRATION
PROGRAM

Published in November 2012, the Leveson Report comprises the findings of
the Leveson Inquiry—an exhaustive review, headed by Lord Justice Leveson8, into
the culture, practice, and ethics of the British press.9 The impetus for the inquiry
was the revelation of phone-hacking tactics utilized by reporters and editors at News
of the World, a now-defunct British publication.10 Police investigations over several years revealed that staff at News of the World had hacked into the phones of
up to hundreds of people, notable victims including members of the British royal
family,11 and thirteen-year-old murder victim Milly Dowler.12 Dozens of individuals ultimately acknowledged they had illegally acquired confidential information,
and several top editors were criminally charged.13 In July 2011, Prime Minister
stated goals of news and gossip website Gawker. Farhad Manjoo, Gawker’s Gone. Long Live Gawker.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/technology/gawkers-gone-long-livegawker.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=1.
6. About IPSO, INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG., https://www.ipso.co.uk/about-ipso/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2016).
7. THE LEVESON INQUIRY, About the Inquiry, LEVESON INQUIRY: CULTURE, PRACTICE AND ETHICS
OF THE PRESS, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/about/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [hereinafter About the Inquiry].
8. Lord Justice Leveson promoted to third top judge, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24286946.
9. About the Inquiry, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Don Van Natta Jr., Jo Becker & Graham Bowley, Tabloid Hack Attack on Royals and Beyond,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/magazine/05hacking-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
12. Phone Hacking Trial explained, BBC NEWS (June 25, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk24894403.
13. Lisa O’Carroll, Phone hacking: 10 years of resignations, cover-ups and convictions, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/dec/11/phone-hacking-10-yearsresignations-cover-ups-convictions.
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David Cameron named Lord Justice Leveson the head of a two-part inquiry,14 to
first to look into the specific circumstances surrounding the News of the World
scandal, and next investigate the general culture and practices of the British press.
The Leveson Inquiry culminated in a 2,000-page final report, published in November 2012. A central recommendation of the Leveson Report was the formation
of an independent body to oversee the press, members of which would be “appointed in a genuinely open, transparent and independent way, without any influence from industry or Government.”15 From this proposal, IPSO was born.16 On
July 26, 2016, IPSO took a major step toward realizing another of the Leveson Report’s major goals:17 an accessible alternative to litigation of claims against the
press.18 The report took note of the barriers faced by those with limited means who
wished to bring claims against powerful media companies,19 and emphasized the
importance of access to justice.20
The report concedes that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods must
be voluntary,21 and ponders how to make these options “sufficiently attractive to
the press so as to encourage them to be part of a regime that provides access to
them, and equally attractive to those who wish to commence proceedings against
the press.”22 One of the more controversial proposals23 of the report was using cost
awards to incentivize the use of ADR.24 The report contemplates changing the conditional fee agreements available to those who pursue traditional litigation, thereby
penalizing plaintiffs who refused to arbitrate their claims.25 The report ultimately

14. Lord Justice Leveson, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/jul/24/lord-justice-leveson-mediaguardian-100-2011.
15. Ian Burrell, Press Regulation: Judge for yourself – the Royal Charter in full, THE INDEPENDENT
(Oct. 29, 2013 10:06 GMT), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/press-regulation-judgefor-yourself-the-royal-charter-in-full-8910572.html.
16. About IPSO, supra note 6.
17. David Engel, Complex, costly and confusing – will IPSO’s pilot arbitration program fly?, PR
WEEK (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.prweek.com/article/1406229/complex-costly-confusing-will-ipsosarbitration-pilot-fly.
18. Arbitration, INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG., https://www.ipso.co.uk/arbitration/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2017).
19. “Privacy claims and claims of the type that have been pursued against the NoTW [News of the
World] are not necessarily straightforward and, in the absence of appropriate legal assistance, there is
no question of an equality of arms between those who claim to have been victimised and the press. The
wealthy will be able to pursue a remedy in court; there will be less incentive for lawyers to take up the
cases of those who are not because the potential uplift in costs now payable out of the damages is likely
to be comparatively modest.” THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD JUSTICE LEVESON, LEVESON REPORT
1505 (2012), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780_iv.pdf.
20. Id. at 1512.
21. “Of course, no one can be forced to give up their right to go to court in pursuit, or for the protection,
of their rights. However, that does not argue against the need for some arbitral system to be available.”
Id. at 1768.
22. Id. at 1696.
23. “Leveson has himself commented that the proposal to penalise claimants who refuse to arbitrate
is one of the most controversial parts of his recommendations.” Ned Beale, Leveson’s media arbitration
scheme,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
19,
2012,
5:46
EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/dec/19/leveson-arbitration-media-claims.
24. LEVESON, supra note 19, at 1698.
25. “Making it more difficult for complainants to use CFAs will put the balance of power firmly back
with the newspapers when it comes to court action, making an alternative route to justice of critical
importance for ordinary individuals.” Id.
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recommends an arbitral process, emphasizing that it must be “fair, quick and inexpensive, inquisitorial and free for complainants to use.”26
IPSO’s pilot arbitration scheme is billed as a “cost-effective process for resolving legal claims against the press.”27 The scheme’s jurisdiction extends to defamation, privacy, and harassment claims, brought within twelve months of the alleged
wrongdoing, against newspapers or magazines participating in the program.28
Some of the most prominent media groups in the United Kingdom are among the
participants, including publishers of Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, OK! Magazine,
The Sun, and Daily Mail.29 While these publications have agreed to take part in the
pilot program, both parties must agree to arbitration for every individual claim.30
The scheme utilizes a panel of arbitrators, all of whom are barristers approved by
IPSO and found to have the “necessary experience and expertise in media law.”31
There are currently eight members on this panel, all with practice experience in
media and privacy law, often on high-profile cases. Claimants under the pilot
scheme are required to pay a £300 administrative fee, and an additional fee of
£2,500 if the claim proceeds to a final ruling.32 Publishers are initially required to
pay £3,800, in addition to their own legal costs, and the same £2,500 final ruling
fee.33 The rules leave the arbitrator the discretion to award fees and legal costs
“based upon the conduct of the parties where this is fair and reasonable.”34 According to IPSO, arbitrators will try to complete claims within 90 days of their appointment.35
Given the lower costs and faster results,36 it appears advantageous for claimants
with limited means to utilize the pilot program. As discussed later in this Comment,
many factors affect the actions of plaintiffs, particularly whether they are a private
or public figure. The yearlong IPSO pilot program will end in July 2017, so analysis
of its successes or failures will not be available for some time after the publication
of this Comment. However, the establishment of such a program reflects the need
for a more cost-efficient option for defamation and libel claims, and the potential
for such an option to benefit both plaintiffs and defendants. This Comment will
next address the current media landscape in the United States, and discuss why U.S.
publishers should consider following in the footsteps of their British counterparts
in order to reap the benefits of arbitration.

26. Id. at 1768.
27. Arbitration, supra note 18.
28. What claims can I make?, INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG., https://www.ipso.co.uk/arbitration/what-claims-can-i-make/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
29. Participating publications, INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG., https://www.ipso.co.uk/arbitration/participating-publications/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
30. Arbitration FAQs, INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG., https://www.ipso.co.uk/faqs/arbitration/ (last
visited Mar. 10, 2017).
31. Arbitration panel, INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG., https://www.ipso.co.uk/arbitration/arbitratorpanel/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
32. Arbitration FAQs, supra note 30.
33. IPSO Pilot Arbitration Scheme Summary, INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG. (July 2016),
https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1263/ipso-pilot-arbitration-scheme-summary-july-2016.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Arbitration FAQs, supra note 30.
36. Jennifer A. Marler, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: The Lower Courts Extend
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. To Include Individual Employment Contracts, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 443, 474 (1996); Stewart, supra note 1, at 138.
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ARBITRATION AND THE INTERESTS OF THE PRESS

While the threat of litigation can make publishers vulnerable, the press has an
interest in contesting claims, because quick settlements may only encourage further
suits.37 This section highlights the major interests of press outlets in defending
claims, and discusses why arbitration offers benefits that alleviate the burdens of
litigation.

A.

Concerns Over Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPPs) in the U.S.

The United States has recently seen rising concern about threats to press freedom, thanks in part to several high-profile suits against media companies, as well
as the election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency.38 One of these highly publicized suits was the invasion-of-privacy claim brought by Hulk Hogan, which shuttered Gawker, a popular news and gossip site.39 After facing an initial jury award
of $140 million, Gawker sold itself to Univision in August 2016.40 The parties
eventually reached a $31 million settlement, but Gawker lost its independence and
its CEO, Nick Denton.41 Throughout the course of the Gawker litigation, it was
revealed that Hulk Hogan’s claim was being financed by Peter Thiel, Silicon Valley
investor and subject of the 2007 Gawker headline “Peter Thiel is totally gay, people,”42 in an apparent act of vengeance against the publication for revealing his sexual orientation. News magazine Mother Jones similarly sunk millions of dollars
into defending a defamation suit arising from a 2012 article43 about Republican
party donor Frank VanderSloot, who brought his claim after the site broke the story
of Mitt Romney’s “47 percent” remarks,44 which some believe cost Romney the
37. “Professor David Anderson noted that the press may find itself in the position of being a ‘repeat
player’ in libel litigation, ‘committed to a policy of aggressively contesting all libel claims’ to deter
future libel plaintiffs.” Stewart, supra note 1, at 158-59.
38. Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump is Elected President in Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html.
39. Nick Denton, How Things Work, GAWKER (Aug. 22, 2016, 4:33 PM), http://gawker.com/howthings-work-1785604699.
40. Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement.html.
41. Id.
42. Owen Thomas, Peter Thiel is totally gay, people, GAWKER (Dec. 19, 2007, 7:05 PM),
http://gawker.com/335894/peter-thiel-is-totally-gay-people.
43. The story that was the subject of VanderSloot’s suit noted that his company, Melaleuca, gave $1
million to Restore Our Future, a super-PAC supporting Mitt Romney. The story also discussed actions
VanderSloot had taken in opposition to gay rights. Mother Jones acknowledged that it does not know
whether the claim by VanderSloot is connected to the story on the “47 percent” remarks. Stephanie
Mencimer, Pyramid-Like Company Ponies Up $1 Million for Mitt Romney, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 6,
2016, 6:36 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/02/mitt-romney-melaleuca-frankvandersloot.
44. During the 2012 presidential campaign, Republican candidate Mitt Romney was captured on video
while speaking at a fundraising event. In his remarks, he stated, “there are 47 percent of the people who
will vote for the president no matter what . . . there are 47 percent who are with him, who are dependent
upon government, who believe that they are victims, who believe the government has a responsibility to
care for them, who believe that they are entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you-name-it. That
that’s an entitlement. And the government should give it to them. And they will vote for this president
no matter what.” Romney went on to state that the people he described paid no income taxes. Molly
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2012 presidential election.45 Mother Jones ultimately won a favorable verdict, but
acknowledged that the suit “consumed a good part of the past two and a half years
and has cost millions (yes, millions) in legal fees.”46 Both cases are examples of
what have been termed Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or
SLAPPs,47 which “function by forcing the target into the judicial arena where the
SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a defense.”48 Twenty-eight states
have enacted anti-SLAPP legislation.49 A federal anti-SLAPP bill, called the Speak
Free Act, was introduced in Congress in 2015.50 The legislation allows for a special
motion to dismiss SLAPPs that arise from expression made in connection with an
official proceeding or matter of public concern.51
To some, the Gawker and Mother Jones suits are anomalies, and not indicative
of the most ubiquitous challenges facing publishers today. To others, however, the
cases are cause for legitimate concern about press freedom.52 Because of the instantaneous nature of modern news, largely disseminated through social media, opportunities for defamation and libel claims abound.53 Particularly in regard to entertainment news and celebrity coverage, many of the practices utilized by Gawker,
including “reflexively criticizing people without giving them the benefit of the
doubt, weaponizing internet outrage against ordinary people who didn’t merit it —
have now become de rigueur online.”54 In her work on the laws of image in the
United States, University of Buffalo law professor Samantha Barbas suggests that
as the opportunities for damaging one’s reputation have grown in the digital age, so
has the public acceptance of bringing suit.55 Her book, “Laws of Image: Privacy
and Publicity in America,” traces the concept of image through the turn of the century and into the modern digital era, in which each person’s image is crafted and
maintained through more and more platforms.56 Barbas recognizes the increased
Moorhead, Mitt Romney says 47 percent of Americans pay no income tax, POLITIFACT (Sept. 18, 2012,
6:06 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/sep/18/mitt-romney/romney-says47-percent-americans-pay-no-income-tax/.
45. Monika Bauerlein & Clara Jeffery, We Were Sued by a Billionaire Political Donor. We Won.
Here’s What Happened., MOTHER JONES (Oct. 8, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/media/2015/10/mother-jones-vandersloot-melaleuca-lawsuit.
46. Id.
47. Anti-SLAPP laws, REP. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/browsemedia-law-resources/digital-journalists-legal-guide/anti-slapp-laws-0 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
48. Alice Glover & Marcus Jimison, S.L.A.P.P. Suits: A First Amendment Issue And Beyond, 21 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 122, 122 (1995).
49. State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-statesfree-speech-protection/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
50. H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015).
51. Id.
52. Katie Rogers & John Herrman, Thiel-Gawker Fight Raises Concerns About Press Freedom, N.Y.
TIMES (May 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/business/media/thiel-gawker-fight-raisesconcerns-about-press-freedom.html.
53. See Shawn A. Bone, Private Harms in the Cyber-World: The Conundrum of Choice of Law for
Defamation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 279, 335 (2005).
54. Manjoo, supra note 5.
55. “We can see, nonetheless, a growing ‘claims consciousness’ around personal image. As the law
expanded its authority over image-based harms and emotional harms, as privacy and libel litigation
gained publicity and apparent social approval, there was a popular awareness that affronts to one’s public
persona could be dealt with legally, if one chose—that legal recourse was one avenue, among many, that
could be pursued, and perhaps should be pursued.” SAMANTHA BARBAS, LAWS OF IMAGE: PRIVACY
AND PUBLICITY IN AMERICA 200 (2015).
56. Id. at 201.
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authority of the law over personal image, and suggests that the effect of this has
been to reinforce individuals’ sense of protectiveness over their own image.57
Concern about press freedom swelled with the victory of President Donald
Trump in the 2016 U.S. election.58 Throughout his campaign, Trump expressed
support for “opening up”59 libel laws, and making it easier to sue publishers of content deemed “purposely negative and horrible and false.”60 Over the years, Trump
has shown a fondness for threatening media entities with legal action.61 He garnered
particular publicity during his campaign after he threatened The New York Times
with a libel suit based on the paper’s publication of an article62 featuring two women
who alleged Trump had groped them.63 Trump’s promises to open up libel laws
have been called into question,64 but his remarks were not without a chilling effect.
In the weeks following Trump’s threat to sue The New York Times, the American
Bar Association declined to publish a report compiled by its own committee of media lawyers on Trump’s litigation history, citing the risk of being sued.65 One person who emerged as an ardent supporter of Trump’s campaign, donating a reported
$1.25 million in the final weeks before the election, was Peter Thiel.66
In short, media outlets today are functioning in a climate where, each time they
publish content, they put themselves at risk of suit.67 Should they choose to defend
a claim for defamation and libel—which is likely in their best interest68—one judgment could potentially bankrupt them. In an economy where turning a profit is
already increasingly difficult,69 publishers would benefit from cutting costs wher-

57. Id. at 200.
58. Mirren Gidda & Zach Schonfeld, Donald Trump’s Threat to Press Freedom: Why It Matters,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 12, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016-election-donald-trumppress-freedom-first-amendment-520389.
59. Hadas Gold, Donald Trump: We’re going to ‘open up’ libel laws, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 2016, 2:31
PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-trump-libel-laws-219866.
60. Id.
61. Trevor Timm, Trump’s many, many threats to sue the press since launching his campaign,
COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.cjr.org/first_person/donald_trump_lawsuit_new_york_times.php.
62. Megan Twohey & Michael Barbaro, Two Women Say Donald Trump Touched Them Inappropriately, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/us/politics/donald-trumpwomen.html?action=click&contentCollection=Politics&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article.
63. Alan Rappeport, Donald Trump Threatens to Sue The Times Over Article on Unwanted Advances,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/us/politics/donald-trump-lawsuitthreat.html.
64. Brian Naylor, Trump’s Promise to “Open Up” Libel Laws Unlikely to Be Kept, NPR (Mar. 26,
2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/26/471846238/trumps-promise-to-open-up-libel-laws-unlikely-to-be-kept.
65. Adam Liptak, Lawyers’ group stifled report calling Trump a ‘libel bully’’ over lawsuit fears,
BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/10/24/fearing-trumpbar-association-stifles-report-calling-him-libel-bully/anji4HveEWLas7oQIf3U9O/story.html?s_campaign=bostonglobe%3Asocialflow%3Afacebook.
66. David Streitfeld, Peter Thiel’s Bet on Donald Trump Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/technology/peter-thiel-bet-donald-trump-wins-big.html.
67. See Bone, supra note 53, at 335.
68. “Professor David Anderson noted that the press may find itself in the position of being a ‘repeat
player’ in libel litigation, ‘committed to a policy of aggressively contesting all libel claims’ to deter
future libel plaintiffs.” Stewart, supra note 1, at 158-59.
69. Amy Mitchell & Jesse Holcomb, State of the News Media 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (June 15, 2016),
http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/state-of-the-news-media-2016/.
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ever possible. It is important for the future of the press that they consider the benefits of arbitration, and follow the example of outlets in the U.K. in testing the viability of an arbitration scheme.
Plaintiffs behind SLAPPs—and any suits generally brought in an effort to garner publicity more than compensation—are unlikely, for many reasons, to be interested in an alternative to litigation. It is the cost, the time, and the spotlight of trial
that they seek, and it is these that arbitration would temper. That is not to say arbitration is devoid of benefits for this class of plaintiffs, and the next section will
discuss the potential benefits these plaintiffs may realize by arbitrating. Despite
some plaintiffs’ partiality to litigation, the trend of threats to press freedom illustrates why it may be important for media outlets to begin utilizing arbitration where
the plaintiffs are amenable to it, to conserve time and expenses whenever possible.
In this endeavor, U.S. press outlets can look to IPSO’s pilot program, and their
British counterparts, as “early adopters” of sorts.

B.

Time and Cost Savings

Paul S. Voakes, journalism professor at the University of Indiana, conducted a
survey to better understand the impact of defamation and libel suits on defendant
journalists. Discussed later in this Comment, the Iowa Libel Research Project found
significant evidence that libel plaintiffs felt they had won just by suing. The study
by Voakes looked at the natural converse: did media defendants feel they had lost
just by being sued? Voakes noted that this “would overstate the results, but it does
seem clear that these journalists, almost all of them victorious in court, felt some
degree of sting in the litigation they experienced.”70 In his interviews, Voakes
spoke with journalists who attributed a chilling effect to the cost and time of possible litigation, more so than any moral or journalistic obligation.71
The most readily apparent advantage of a forum like arbitration for media defendants is lower cost, and less time before a final ruling.72 Press outlets can spend
years defending defamation and libel claims in court, particularly in cases where an
actual malice standard is applied.73 Under the American Arbitration Association’s
rules, fees depend on the number of arbitrators used, and the relief sought.74 In
cases before a single arbitrator, the consumer filing fee is $200, and the business
filing fee is $1,700.75 Daily arbitrator fees are either $1,500 or $750, depending on
whether the case is in-person, or a desk arbitration.76
Beyond the lower upfront costs, other arbitration instruments may weigh in the
press’s favor, such as caps on damages. Under the pilot program implemented by

70. Paul S. Voakes, Lessons Learned: A Lawsuit’s Impact on Journalistic Behavior, 4 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 87, 106 (1999).
71. Id. at 104-105.
72. Marler, supra note 36, at 474.
73. Stewart, supra note 1, at 138.
74. AM.
ARBITRATION
ASS’N,
CONSUMER
ARBITRATION
RULES
8
(2016),
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=latestreleased.
75. Id. at 33.
76. Id. See also Am. Arbitration Ass’n, AAA Arbitration Glossary of Terms, ALTERNATIVE DISP.
RESOL., https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004198 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (“In a
Desk Arbitration, the parties submit their arguments and evidence to the arbitrator in writing. The arbitrator then makes an award based only on the documents. No hearing is held.”).
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IPSO, an arbitrator may award a maximum of £50,000 in damages.77 This amount
is not insignificant, but it pales in comparison to the millions of dollars in judgments
and attorneys’ fees faced by Gawker and Mother Jones.78
The other primary aspect of arbitration’s efficiency is that it typically takes less
time than litigation. “According to the National Arbitration Forum, a dispute resolution services provider that handles many commercial and consumer cases, the
median time it takes to arbitrate such disputes is 104 days, compared to 650 to 720
days for litigation of similar cases in court.”79 The IPSO program aims to resolve
claims within 90 days.80

C.

Choice of Fact-Finder

In determining what forum is likely to be most favorable toward them, media
defendants must also consider who will serve as the fact-finder. Media companies
would likely be eager to avoid juries, which have historically handed down large
verdicts for libel plaintiffs (an average of $2.9 million from 1980 to 2006).81 Under
the rules of the American Arbitration Association, parties are able to select arbitrators with some expertise in the subject matter of the dispute.82 This could be valuable in the context of libel and defamation claims, in that media defendants could
utilize arbitrators with an understanding of both First Amendment law and traditional newsroom practices, and not worry about a jury’s understanding of the case.83
As mentioned earlier in this discussion, IPSO’s pilot program employs a panel
of eight arbitrators, all barristers deemed to have the requisite experience and expertise in media law.84 An article in The Guardian presented a twofold concern
about this aspect of the scheme: whether the large number of media lawyers with
ties to media organizations would impact the availability of neutral mediators, and
whether an arbitration against the press could be effectively run with just one person
at the helm.85 The latter issue could be ameliorated by a suggestion in the very same
article—providing arbitrators with additional clerks to handle procedural legwork,
though this could result in additional administrative costs. Neutrality would likely
be the larger issue, since people with expertise in media law very well may have
experience working for the press, whether as a journalist, editor, or general counsel.
Still, though, in a nation as large as the United States, the availability of neutral
experts on media law is not likely to preclude the arbitration of libel and defamation
claims.

D.

Limited Review

A defendant media company is also likely to look favorably upon the limited
review available in arbitration. Restrictions on review not only further curb the time
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Arbitration FAQs, supra note 30.
Ember, supra note 40; Bauerlein & Jeffery, supra note 45.
Stewart, supra note 1, at 156.
Arbitration FAQs, supra note 30.
Stewart, supra note 1, at 157. See also Ember, supra note 40.
Stewart, supra note 1, at 157; Arbitration FAQs, supra note 30.
Stewart, supra note 1, at 157.
Arbitration panel, supra note 31.
Beale, supra note 23.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

9

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2017, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 13

174

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2017

and cost of the entire process, but also lend assurance to the parties that the arbitrator’s decision will be binding and final. Especially where, like in IPSO’s program,
arbitration is considered in the context of voluntary agreements, the parties would
likely agree at the outset on the finality of the ruling. Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s award are limited to fraud or corruption,
or an arbitrator being guilty of misconduct or exceeding their powers.86 Given that
some of the vulnerability of publishers lies in the lengthy litigation process of defamation and libel claims, lesser opportunity for review would be advantageous for
publishers.
In IPSO’s pilot program, most claims are first directed to a preliminary ruling
procedure, where the arbitrator rules on the core issues.87 After this preliminary
ruling, the arbitration is stayed and the parties have a 21-day period in which they
may reach a settlement or the claimant may withdraw the claim.88 At the parties’
request, the arbitration may proceed to a final, binding ruling.89

E.

Potential Disadvantages

Though arbitration offers many benefits to publishers, there are potential downsides to consider. One is the wide range of available remedies. Arbitration of a
defamation or libel claim may result in awards that would not be available in a
traditional trial, such as printing a retraction, or even giving the opposing party the
chance to tell their side of the story.90 Press outlets are unlikely to relish any outside
control over their content, and may prefer to take a monetary loss instead.
The most significant downside of arbitration for the media is the potential for
changes in the application of First Amendment protections. The precedent of First
Amendment law puts the press in a position of relative comfort with claims for
defamation and libel. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan, a public official must prove actual malice—knowledge that the published
information was false, or published with reckless disregard as to whether it was
false—in order to succeed in a claim for defamation or libel.91 Public officials have
struggled to bring successful claims since this high standard was established.92 In
Gertz v. Welch, the Supreme Court held that different standards apply to public and
private plaintiffs, and states may allow for private individuals to recover on any
standard except no-fault liability.93 This precedent does not necessarily bind arbitrators, 94 which could be of great concern for press outlets going to arbitration.
However, in the context of voluntary agreements to arbitrate, parties would have
the opportunity to agree on the relevant law to be applied. Additionally, a change

86. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012); Stewart, supra note 1, at 157.
87. IPSO Pilot Arbitration Scheme Summary, supra note 33.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Stewart, supra note 1, at 159.
91. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
92. Claire Steinman, Defamation And False Rape Claims: Policies, Attitudes, And Suggested Reform
In The United States And The United Kingdom, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 907, 911 (2013).
93. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
94. Stewart, supra note 1, at 160.
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in application of First Amendment protections may incentivize plaintiffs to pursue
arbitration.95

IV. ARBITRATION AND THE INTERESTS OF PLAINTIFFS
Other authors have explored the prospect of binding readers to arbitration
through clauses in publications themselves,96 but this Comment does not address
the contract implications of such a proposal. Instead, this discussion is limited to
voluntary agreements to arbitrate defamation and libel claims, and the reasons arbitration would ultimately benefit both sides. In libel and defamation law, current
status quo favors the extremes—it is typically wealthy individuals who can bring
suits, and publications with extensive resources that can survive them.97 So why
might someone with a claim for defamation or libel choose arbitration?98 This section assesses the most common interests and objectives of libel plaintiffs, and argues
that the benefits are likely to outweigh any perceived advantages of litigation.

A.

Libel Plaintiffs Seek More than Monetary Redress

University of Iowa professors Randall Bezanson, Gilbert Cranberg and John
Soloski, interested in the motivations of defamation and libel plaintiffs, began the
Iowa Libel Research Project, to “better understand the dynamics of the libel dispute
and the actions and motivations of the parties to it.”99 They conducted an extensive
study of libel claims against the media, interviewing 164 plaintiffs and defendants
to libel suits, and assessing data on rates of suit, liability, and settlement. Their
analysis of plaintiffs’ retrospective attitudes toward libel litigation is valuable when
considering why plaintiffs may benefit from arbitrating these claims.
The researchers sought to understand why the plaintiffs brought suit when the
odds of winning were low,100 and the average awards modest.101 One of the major
conclusions, based on their own research and earlier work by the Iowa Libel Research Project, was that plaintiffs’ primary incentives were nonmonetary.102 What
plaintiffs wanted most—more than pecuniary relief—was to restore their reputation
by correcting the factual record, and the research found that “this objective is accomplished in significant degree independent of the judicial result in the case.”103
95. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772,
823 (1985).
96. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 141.
97. LEVESON, supra note 19, at 1500 (“Those of sufficient personal wealth can afford to fund legal
advice and representation. Those who are not, cannot.”).
98. See generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Building a Pedagogy of Problem-Solving: Learning to
Choose Among ADR Processes, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113 (2000) (assessing ADR options for a defamation claimant, and how his attorney might counsel him on each one).
99. Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 789-91 (1986).
100. “Most plaintiffs lost in court. Even for those who won, the terms of judicial victory were disappointing. Successful litigants obtained an average of $ 80,000 in damage awards. Excluding two large
awards, however, the average recovery was only $20,600, a sizeable portion of which went to fees and
costs.” Id. at 790-91.
101. Id. at 791.
102. Id.; see also Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record
Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226 (1985) [hereinafter Bezanson, Libel Law].
103. Bezanson, Libel Law, supra note 102, at 227.
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In studying the life cycle of a libel suit, the researchers found that many plaintiffs
first contacted the media outlet directly, then, unhappy with the response, hired
counsel in order to bring suit.104 The media defendants generally confirmed this
view.105 Focused more on setting the record straight than earning a windfall, plaintiffs saw the filing of the claim as a significant achievement in itself: “To them, the
libel suit represents an official engagement of the judicial system on their behalf,
and the act of suing represents a legitimation of their claims of falsehood.”106
This view of engaging the justice system as a form of compensation in itself
illustrates the role of honor perceived to be at stake in these suits.107 In his discussion of honor and the law, William and Mary Law School professor Nathan Oman
explores the historical practice of dueling, and its underlying moral purpose. While
the actual practice of the duel is a clear anachronism, its objective of creating “a
situation of acknowledged equality”108 lives on—it is merely sought through other
means today. Professor Samantha Barbas similarly compares the honor at stake in
modern defamation and libel claims with the practice of dueling in the premodern
South.109 She proposes viewing the modern lawsuit as “an accompaniment to, or
perhaps substitute for dueling and other acts of physical violence in defense of
honor and reputation.”110 These comparisons illustrate why the underlying injuries
in a suit for defamation or libel are best redressed by the act of formally addressing
the dispute. In proposing an international arbitral forum for the resolution of defamation claims, Shawn Bone ponders what remedy should be available if a determination of falsity is made.111 Looking at the underlying purposes of the law, Bone
concludes the best remedy is not damages, but “to require that other words be used
to restore the reputation of the plaintiff.”112 If nonmonetary compensation is truly
what best serves the interests of libel plaintiffs, it is apparent that the current litigation process is not an efficient means of achieving this.
Would arbitration serve the purpose of an official engagement of the justice
system? While in a certain sense arbitration may be viewed as a less formal process
than litigation,113 filing a claim through arbitration is by no means “unofficial.” Parties who agree to arbitrate a claim are thereby obligating themselves to participate
in the adjudication process and adhere to the ultimate ruling. Arbitration is a widely
used method of dispute resolution, and has grown in popularity with large businesses over the last several decades.114 Since the passing of the Federal Arbitration
Act in 1925, “[arbitration’s] proponents have secured institutional acceptance of the
process from business, bench and bar.115 The very existence of IPSO’s program
104. Bezanson, supra note 99, at 791-92.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 791.
107. “The claims of honor are strongest in the case of intentional torts, particularly those that are aimed
directly at a subject’s standing before others, such as the torts of libel or defamation.” Nathan B. Oman,
The Honor Of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 64 (2011).
108. Id. at 58.
109. BARBAS, supra note 55, at 76.
110. BARBAS, supra note 55, at 77.
111. Bone, supra note 53, at 331.
112. Id.
113. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 433 (1988).
114. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 300 (2014) [hereinafter Stipanowich,
Reflections].
115. Stipanowich, supra note 113, at 425-26.
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demonstrates that a developed nation, with a long and influential judicial history,
recognizes arbitration as a legitimate, and often appropriate, means of resolving
defamation and libel claims.

B.

The Modern Litigation Process Presents Substantial Obstacles to
Plaintiffs

As was discussed in the context of the IPSO program, the primary benefit of
an alternative to litigation for plaintiffs is lower cost and faster results. Suits in the
United States can drag on for years while attorneys’ fees and court costs pile up, as
the Gawker and Mother Jones cases illustrate.116 Here, again, the interests of private
and public plaintiffs are likely to diverge. Public figures are cognizant of the hurdles of litigation at the outset, and they are unlikely to fear the economic repercussions of suing.117 According to the Iowa project, it was these public plaintiffs who
saw litigation as the most effective solution available to them, given that cost was
less of an issue, and a public statement denying the libel was seen as a less desirable
remedy.118 In contrast, plaintiffs who have a lower legal standard to meet for a
defamation claim119 were the least likely to see litigation as providing an attractive
remedy. Those private plaintiffs were the ones most economically vulnerable, most
unhappy with their counsel, and most likely to end up paying the bill. The study
concluded that private plaintiffs were “directly and effectively discouraged by the
rules and results of the legal system.”120
It is not merely the high cost, but the complexities of the judicial process that
frustrate plaintiffs. Of the libel plaintiffs surveyed through the University of Iowa
project, 34% expressed dissatisfaction with the end result of their suit, and 31%
expressed extreme dissatisfaction.121 In studying specific comments from the plaintiffs, the study found this dissatisfaction was tied to frustration with the unresponsiveness of the judicial system to their claimed harm.122 The plaintiffs felt that
“while the lawsuit itself serves their reputational objectives, the formal legal system
often does not.” Despite this significant dissatisfaction with the judicial system,
“[a]bsent an alternative process, 95% of the plaintiffs stated that they would sue
again. This proportion holds for plaintiffs who lost.”123 Just 10% of losing plaintiffs
cited the punishment of media as an accomplishment of suing. This relatively low
number could be attributable to the fact that these plaintiffs lost, and therefore did
not achieve the full “punishment” they might have sought. But the researchers’
results suggested another reason for this number: a shift from anger and frustration
with the media, to anger with the justice system. Out of the plaintiffs who expressed
dissatisfaction with their litigation experience, “67% direct it in whole or in part
116. Denton, supra note 39; Bauerlein & Jeffery, supra note 45.
117. “As a general proposition, a libel suit costs little if anything for plaintiffs classified as public officials or public figures under the Sullivan and Gertz cases . . . While very few plaintiffs win, and the
incidence of judicial victory is smallest with public officials, the vast majority of plaintiffs who lost
indicate that they would sue again, knowing what happened; indeed, virtually every public official we
spoke with would sue again.” Bezanson, Libel Law, supra note 102, at 228-29.
118. Bezanson, supra note 99, at 798-99.
119. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
120. Bezanson, supra note 99, at 799.
121. Id. at 795.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 797.
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toward the judicial system.”124 According to the authors, “[t]his strongly suggests
that a disjunction exists between the plaintiffs’ objectives—some of which are
achieved despite the formal judicial outcome—and the rules and results of the judicial process. It also suggests that this disjunction is a source of great frustration
among plaintiffs.”125 If the “rules and results of the judicial process” are one of the
primary affronts to libel plaintiffs, perhaps a system with different rules may yield
more favorable results. Further, a survey conducted by David Boies found that, out
of the total costs of defamation litigation spent by both plaintiff and defendant, between 3.5% and 8% of the total expenses ended up going to the plaintiff, with the
rest covering legal fees and expenses.126

C.

The Confidentiality of Arbitration May Further Plaintiffs’ Reputational Interest

Plaintiffs with a claim for libel or defamation already feel they have suffered a
significant harm in the public eye. While to some extent, plaintiffs wish to make a
public reclamation of honor through a defamation suit, in doing so, they expose
themselves to the risk of further humiliation and harm. The discovery process in
traditional litigation can be lengthy and thorough, sometimes revealing sensitive
information.127 In light of this, the closed-doors nature of arbitration128 may be attractive to plaintiffs who worry about what a contentious trial could uncover. In
Hulk Hogan’s suit against Gawker, the trial focused on the distinction between
Terry Bollea (Hogan’s real name) and his wrestling persona, whether or not his sex
life was newsworthy, and his personal relationships with the other parties involved.129 Laying out intimate, personal details in a courtroom does not very well
serve the interest of most libel and defamation plaintiffs: shielding their reputation.
In IPSO’s pilot scheme, communications between the parties, and all rulings but the
final ruling, are treated as confidential unless parties agree otherwise in writing.130
An additional reputational concern is the prospect of further publicity.131 Forty
percent of plaintiffs in the University of Iowa study cited the stopping of further
publicity as an accomplishment.132 It is hard to imagine this accomplishment
changing in the context of arbitration. Plaintiffs’ grievances would be just as clear
to the publisher, and the cessation of further publicity just as available a remedy as
in litigation. In fact, publicity surrounding the suit itself might be reduced in arbitration, if proceedings were kept confidential. And, although the broader remedial
powers of arbitrators may be a drawback for defendants,133 plaintiffs could see this
124. Id. at 796.
125. Id.
126. Boies, supra note 4.
127. Katie M. Patton, Unfolding Discovery Issues That Plague Sexual Harassment Suits, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 991, 991 (2006).
128. Richard Reuben, Secrecy and Transparency in Dispute Resolution: Confidentiality in Arbitration:
Beyond the Myth, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2006).
129. Ravi Somaiya, When Is Hulk Hogan Not Hulk Hogan?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/09/business/media/when-is-hulk-hogan-not-hulk-hogan.html.
130. INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG., ARBITRATION PILOT SCHEME RULES 21 (2016),
https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1263/ipso-pilot-arbitration-scheme-rules-may-2016.pdf.
131. Bezanson, supra note 99, at 794.
132. Id. at 795.
133. Stewart, supra note 1, at 159.
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as a way to receive something more meaningful than monetary compensation. Under the IPSO program, arbitrators may order the publisher not to re-publish the information at issue, remove the information from a website or online platform, deliver or destroy offending material, and even publish a summary of the arbitrator’s
final rulings.134 However, IPSO arbitrators do not have the authority to grant prepublication injunctions.135

V.

CONCLUSION

The modern litigation process for defamation and libel claims against the press
does much to delay or prevent both parties from achieving their interests. The time
and expense of litigation can both prevent plaintiffs with valid claims from ever
bringing them, and threaten the very existence of the media entities that choose to
defend themselves. The digital age allows for myriad opportunities for claims, and
it is increasingly acceptable for plaintiffs to seek formal redress. Those who have
been wronged often desire something other than money. They wish to have their
voice heard, and their reputation restored. The characteristics of arbitration make
it a better forum, in many cases, for resolving claims of defamation and libel against
the press. Recognizing this, press outlets in the United Kingdom are in the process
of testing an arbitral scheme that will lessen the barriers to justice faced by parties
to these claims. In the United States, SLAPPs present legitimate threats to publications, and politicians can run successful campaigns on promises to punish the media. Arbitration offers a chance to resolve claims with time and cost savings on
both sides, and a better chance for deserving plaintiffs to achieve meaningful recovery. Media outlets must be attentive to the outcomes of IPSO’s pilot arbitration
program, and view it as a prospective model for arbitrating defamation and libel
claims here in the United States.

134. What outcomes are available?, INDEP. PRESS STANDARDS ORG., https://www.ipso.co.uk/faqs/arbitration/#what-outcomes-are-available (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
135. Id.
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